Canadian relations with China, historically, have been driven by missionary work and the search for expanded trade. Missionary work drew on the search for souls to save, but morphed into development (schools and hospitals). Trade promotion, meanwhile, drew on age-olds tropes of "Oriental riches" and "the China market." The missionary and merchant impulses have intertwined in Sino-Canadian relations. This paper examines post-missionary engagement with China by Canadian churches and human rights advocacy by Canadian non-governmental organizations since the 1970s. The focus is on two ecumenical coalitions sponsored by the Canadian churches: the Canada China Programme and the Canada Asia Working Group. The former stressed themes of partnership with Chinese Christian networks as the People's Republic of China began to open up to the world; the latter stressed advocacy for human rights and economic justice. The tensions within these coalitions illustrates the larger tension between engagement and trade on the one hand, and rights advocacy on the other, in Sino-Canadian relations. These case studies also show the importance of non-state actors in trans-Pacific relations.
Canadian human rights groups were central in each case in pushing political leaders to make rhetorical commitments to human rights. The Mulroney government announced a linkage between human rights and foreign aid. The Chrétien government delinked the two, but made "the promotion of Canadian values" one of the declared "three pillars" of its foreign policy. The
Harper government has treated the public to a series of righteous speeches about democracy and human rights. In other words, rights groups have been effective in shaping the terms of debate and forcing political leaders to pledge allegiance to human rights as an integral aspect of Canada's foreign policy. They have shaped what Michael Ignatieff, in his days as a human rights scholar, called "rights talk." Rights talk is important, but it has had to contend with the "rhetoric gap" that is perhaps the most notable feature of Canadian foreign policy.
One of the vital debates in Canadian foreign relations since the 1980s has been the question of linkage between trade and human rights. Canadians tell pollsters they want their government to promote rights and democracy. The Mulroney government even established an agency designed to do that-the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (better known as Rights and Democracy)-which the current Harper government later disbanded. On the other hand, each government has ultimately prioritized trade in its relations with other countries, for obvious reasons.
There are two main threads in Canada's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). One is the drive to engage, as seen most visibly in the promotion of exports to China.
The other thread has been to change China, to help its people through the promotion of values embraced rhetorically in Canada and described as universal. One might call these the Merchant and the Missionary impulses. Both aim to engage China, but in different ways. Sometimes the two threads run parallel; sometimes in opposition. Both hearken back to images of China that reflected a country more of the Canadian imagination than a real place in East Asia. The Merchant impulse draws on age-old tropes of "Oriental riches" and the "China market" that date to the early modern days before Canada existed. The Missionary impulse also recalls "China's
Millions" waiting to be saved by an uplifting Christian gospel.
One of the early acts of the PRC was to expel Western missionaries. Canadian churches, which had been deeply invested in the country, felt the "loss of China" as keenly as American Republican politicians. They looked sadly for new mission fields and prayed for the day when they might regain access to China and communion with its Christians. Where U.S. policy sought to isolate "Red China," Canadian policymakers hoped at times to engage it, to enmesh China in the international system once again. Canadians with an interest in China recall the Diefenbaker wheat deals and especially the pioneering Trudeau government recognition of China as special moments in which Canadian engagement trumped American containment, and celebrate, too, the U.S. government's acceptance of engagement in the 1970s. The opening of a Canadian embassy in Beijing in 1971, then, stands as a moment in Canadian nationalism. A government-business nexus came to set the terms of Canada's relations with China, and they could be summed up in one word: Engage! Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights in China increasingly disputed those policies. If the Merchant impulse was central in the dominant government-business nexus, this non-state network drew on the Missionary impulse to propose a counter-policy. It is the human rights groups, and their influence in shaping a debate, that are the focus of this essay. It highlights two types of non-state networks. One is the post-1970s
Canadian churches, which were eager to both engage with China and promote their values. The other is dedicated human rights groups, ranging from Amnesty International to the Canada Tibet Committee, who tried to put rights promotion at the centre of Sino-Canadian relations.
Part of China's opening to the world, starting in the late 1970s, was to grant permission to approved Chinese Christian groups to resume their activities and even their contacts with church groups outside China. This was also a period in which Canadian churches increasingly sought to insert themselves into national debates through ecumenical coalitions grounded in principles of social justice, human rights, and global partnerships. In the China case, churches were torn because of their conflicting desires to promote social justice principles and demands for silence from partner churches working in the very different political climate of China. Three groups illustrate these points: the Amity Foundation, the Canada Asia Working Group, and the Canada China Programme. A new chapter in the history of China has begun; a new era has dawned. A new 'People's Government' has been born under the leadership of the Communist Party, with the co-operation of all the revolutionary elements of the country, and with the avowed common purpose of putting into execution the political, social and economic principles of the New Democracy . . .. We Christians in China feel the urgent necessity of reexamining our work and our relationship with the older churches abroad in light of this historical change in China . . .. Just how the Christian gospel can be witnessed in a clime that is, by virtue of its ideology, fundamentally materialistic and atheistic presents a challenge stronger than ever before . . .. The banner of the Cross has never been easy to carry and it will not be easy in the new era of China.
14 While welcoming continued missionary involvement, Chinese churches knew they had to purge themselves of foreign control and that Christians would face hard times. The authors of this message therefore wrote that they would have to accept government leadership in providing social services and education and "conform with the general pattern of service, organization and administration." The CCP's first major initiative came in 1981 with its "New Beginning" conference, with ten China over in our image." The speech stirred a hornet's nest, indicating a shift in thinking towards the CAWG method, but the CCP director stood by her words, telling her board the speech was an example of "standing up" for CCP partners. "In the end, this paper is all about PARTNERSHIP," she insisted. 28 The CAWG, on the other hand, was playing a lead role in NGO calls to integrate rights and economic justice concerns into the Chrétien government push for more trade with Asia. At CAWG, such work has been undertaken from a set of values, within a particular framework, using a specific type of language (e.g. human rightsvalues which impel us to advance human rights yield advocacy strategies which call on us to employ very specific language).
In that work, "the contribution of the Chinese church is one contribution but should not be seen as the only or defining piece."
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On the other hand, the officials who had worked on China for the Anglican, Presbyterian, and especially United Churches hewed to the China Christian Council line that Canadian churches should be "faithful to our agenda and not impose your agenda." (Despite this, other Presbyterian officials preferred China work that "more closely follows CAWG's approach" with increased support for underground churches.)
The CCC was willing to see CAWG include China in its regional analysis "as long as we do not expect input or response from them, we keep them informed of what we are doing, writing, and saying, and we do not focus on human rights issues in such a way that interferes with their capacity to do their work in a sensitive context." 31 Armed with this ambiguous blessing, the churches added funding in 1999 for a third full-time CAWG staff person to deal with China, Japan, and Taiwan (included since it was important to any regional economic analysis and because of its historic Presbyterian missionary presence). This did nothing to resolve tensions, as the discussion at a CAWG retreat revealed. "Some of our partners have compromised and we have to take the lead from them," a steering committee member from the old CCP circles argued.
"If we became associated even with pro-democracy groups here, we could be written off." A CAWG staffer had this response: "Part of our role is to gently prod our partners." And another participant noted the calls of one of the Canadian rights NGOs with which CAWG networked, the Canada Tibet Committee, calling for a boycott of visits to China. 32 Definitions of solidarity and partnership were clashing, and the expanded Canada Asia Working Group proved unable to "hold in balance human rights and partnerships," as one steering committee member bemoaned. Trade and rights, Axworthy argued, were "not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing."
Good governance, including respect for rights and the rule of law, made growth possible, and growth made stable rights-respecting societies more likely. 37 This reflected the prevailing Western government consensus. Canada, the United States, Australia, and Western European states had introduced resolutions in the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) critical of the PRC's human rights record, including its record in Tibet, for some years. China had the votes to defeat those efforts, but the symbolic value was nevertheless strong and the exercise served as pressure on Beijing.
In 1997, the UNCHR effort began to collapse as governments keen for better trade with the PRC embraced a new approach-"bilateral human rights dialogues." The logic behind this tactic was that two countries will sit down together for a conversation about means to strengthen human rights, present concerns to each other, and work for improvements in a confidential, confidence-building atmosphere; this in turn would diffuse rights norms and values. 38 Australia led the pursuit of this new approach in 1996, announcing it would end its sponsorship of the annual UNCHR resolution on human rights in China, and instead focus its efforts on a bilateral dialogue. At the 1997 UNCHR, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Japan also dropped their sponsorship. Human Rights Watch called this shift a "sustained attack" on the "universality of human rights-the fundamental premise that they apply to all nations without exception."
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Canada joined the shift. Instead of backing UNCHR resolutions, Canada would conduct its human rights diplomacy (HRD) in private, one on one, with more reliance on "bilateral and quiet diplomacy channels." 40 This reacted to apparent Chinese receptivity to rights dialogue, and picked up on prior Canadian "quiet diplomacy" on human rights in China.
Chinese government officials, as researcher and former diplomat Charles Burton's influential review of the China-Canada HRD recounts, characterized the dialogue with Canada as a "model"
HRD, "one of the best ones," showing "less political prejudice against us." Chinese officials clearly understood the HRD as a concession to Canada in exchange for taking no action at the UNCHR, one serving a domestic political need of the Canadian government by disarming NGO criticism. 41 Evidence of the HRD leading to change in China is lacking. As the Charter 08 declaration Chinese dissidents approved points out, "this political progress stops at the paper stage." 42 Despite earlier assertions that HRD was one mechanism for use alongside other forms of advocacy for human rights, officials pointed to HRD itself as a contribution to rights in China.
In sum, process replaced pressure. Nor was it clear that there was any need to end Canadian cosponsorship of a UNCHR resolution to carry out dialogue on human rights with the Chinese government. In 1996, Canadian and Chinese diplomats held a meeting devoted to human rights in Beijing, one unaffected by continuing Canadian sponsorship of the annual UNCHR resolution.
Rather than the hoped-for "diffusion and enmeshment" of China in international human rights regimes, Chinese diplomats have been effective in altering international human rights norms.
A coalition of Canadian human rights organizations concerned about China formed to oppose the HRD process. "There is no use engaging in private government to government discussions on human rights when there is no system for public accountability nor benchmarks by which to The bilateral human rights dialogue has not achieved its objectives, the situation of human rights in China has deteriorated, and Canada's access to China's markets has not yet increased. More importantly, the UN human rights system has been weakened by manipulation and application of a double standard.
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These two concerns-effectiveness and the erosion of the international human rights systemconvinced a normally cautious organization to speak out against the dialogue process and to call for a more effective form of "engagement" on bilateral grounds. The effect on global human rights regimes, weakened by Chinese pressure for a shift from multilateral resolutions to bilateral and secretive "dialogues," was central to broadening the human rights NGO coalition beyond groups focused on China and Tibet, to include groups that took a global approach to rights.
On the other hand, church groups demurred. At an NGO campaign meeting in Montreal, Canadian human rights NGOs will have to respond creatively to the so-called "peaceful rise" of China. It will require partnership, but that need not mean allowing state-sponsored partners in the PRC to impose silence on groups in Canada. Partnership must mean each side can speak out.
It is important to realize that no Canadian human rights activist seeks to return to "isolating" or "containing" the PRC. Instead, they seek a different and broader engagement with China that goes beyond the state-sanctioned level. It is also important for Canadian human rights NGOs to take an approach that does not single out the PRC as a unique, exceptional case. There should be no embrace of "Chinese exceptionalism." Instead, transnational, global thinking is required.
Anything else would be to accept that human rights are not, as rights groups insist, "universal and indivisible." Canadians need to be multilateral, rather than bilateral, to be effective. Also, Canadian human rights groups should continue to be self-critical on Canada's own record of human rights violations, from Afghanistan to Alberta. And finally, rights promotion partnerships have to be at least regional in approach, meaning two-way, and Asia-wide, not solely China- 
